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SAY IT WITH MUSIC
I HAVE elsewhere suggested that judges, when applying (and
therefore interpreting) statutory or other legal rules, may be
compared with musical performers when playing (and therefore
interpreting) musical compositions; that, perforce, judges, like
musical performers, are to some extent creative artists.' That
comparison invites another, a comparison between criticism of the
products of fine artists and criticism of judicial decisions. Such a
discussion may seem to some persons to support the Englishman
C. K. Allen's characterization of the ideas of some American
lawyers as "jazz jurisprudence." 2 But I shall risk such name
calling. For, even in England, jazz has influenced serious musical
composers; I and an English musical critic, after stating that
"we must realize that the human mind reacts against the accep-
tance of new ideas," goes on to say: "When Monteverdi, over
three hundred years ago published the System of Discords, the
whole host of critics took up arms against him. Yet in time his
theories became current practice, and were included in even the
most academic text-books of composition . . . These styles and
developments have been absorbed into our musical vocabulary
until by now they are meaningless conventionalities. As com-
posers 9trive to penetrate unexplored fields of musical interpreta-
tion, they invariably encounter this conservative reaction against
the unfamiliar." 4
'Frank, Words and Music, 47 COL. L. REv. 1259 (1947).
'ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 45 (3d ed. 1939).
' Harris, The Influence of Jazz on English Composers, 2 PENGUIN MUSIC MAG.
25 (1946).
' Herbage, Brains Trust, I PENGUIN Music MAG. 75, 76 (1946).
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If what I say is superficial, my anticipatory defense is that, in
a sense, I am pioneering. For, although the nature of fine-art
criticism, and of criticism of such criticism, has been explored for
centuries,5 little similar exploration has been conducted in the
realm of judicial decisions.
I shall here discuss but one phase of this broad subject: the
criticism of trial-court decisions in cases involving oral testimony
as to contested issues of fact. I limit the discussion to trial-court
decisions in such cases because such decisions are of prime im-
portance to most persons who litigate: the overwhelming majority
of decisions are not appealed; the disputes in most of the rela-
tively few appealed cases turn on such issues of fact, and the
appellate courts accept the trial court's determination of the facts
in a large percentage of such cases. I shall also, for convenience,
confine my discussion largely to nonjury cases.
I. IMPORTANCE OF EVALUATION OF FACT-FINDING TO
CRITICISM OF DECISIONS
According to the oversimplified conventional theory, a trial
judge's decision not only should, but invariably does, result from
the application of a substantive legal rule ' to the facts of the case.
This theory may be crudely symbolized thus: I if we call the rule
R, the facts F, and the decision D, then RXF=D. It seems to
assure us that, if we know the judge's R and the F, we can criti-
cally examine his D. We may disagree with his D because we think
(i) that his F is wrong (i.e., his statement of the facts is mis-
taken), (2) that the R he used is an improper R, or (3) that he
has incorrectly' applied a proper R to facts which he correctly
found (i.e., he has erred in his logic).
Usually, appraisal of the trial judge's R is fairly easy; and, if
we accept his F as correct, so, too, is an appraisal of his logic.
Within the framework of the conventional theory, the major
obstacle to criticism of his decision inheres in the difficulty of
determining whether or not his F, his fact-finding or statement of
the facts, is mistaken.
' See, e.g., KALLFN, ART AND FREEDOM (1942) ; McKeon, The Philosophic Bases
of Art and Criticism, 41 MOD. PHILOLOGY 65 (1943).
' I use "rule" in this paper to include rules, principles, and standards.
I See FRANx, IF MaN WERE ANGELS 77 et seq. (1942) ; In re Fried, i61 F.2d 453,
464 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
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This difficulty is greatest when a trial judge tries a case in
which, as to a pivotal issue of fact, the testimony is oral and in
conflict. The trial judge can have no firsthand knowledge of the
facts, since they happened out of his presence in the past. He must,
therefore, function as a historian.' To say that he "finds" the facts
is to mislead; the facts, for him, are not "data," that is, "given," -
are not waiting somewhere, ready-made, for him to discover. In
a very real sense the facts are, for the judge, a matter of "opin-
ion," not of "knowledge." I His "findings" of fact necessarily
derive from his appraisal of the stories the witnesses tell him about
those past facts. The witnesses, in turn, being human, are fallible
reporters: they may have mistakenly observed the events con-
cerning which they testify; they may mistakenly recollect their
observations; they may mistakenly (deliberately or unintention-
ally) report those recollections in court. The trial judge is but a
witness of the words and conduct of the witnesses. He, also
human, may be fallible in such witnessing. And when the witnesses
tell him discrepant stories, he must, as best he can, surmise which
(if any) of them honestly and accurately reported the facts.Y In
'See In re Fried, 16i F.2d 453, 462 and n.2i (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
' It is of interest that Plato, distinguishing between "knowledge" and "opin-
ion," refers to the experience of judges. "When," says Socrates, "judges are justly
persuaded about matters which you can only know by seeing them, and not in
any other way, and when thus judging of them from reports they attain a true
opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded,
if they have judged well. ... And yet, . . . if true opinion . . . and knowledge
are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge;
and therefore I must infer that they are not the same." THEAETETUS 201-02.
Jowett, commenting on this passage, writes, "The correctness of such an opin-
ion will be purely accidental . . . . Plato would have done better if he had said
that true opinion was a contradiction in terms." 4 JowETT, DnMoGUEs OF PLATO
151 (1892). See FRa x, FATE AND FREEDOM 174--87 (1945) (even for "exact"
science, "facts" are not as "hard" as is often supposed).
10 Even the witnesses, at best, infer the actual facts, have but opinions about
them: "A comparatively slight acquaintance with formal metaphysics is enough
to assure us that the apparently simplest 'fact' is indeed a conclusion, involving in
its affirmation an inference from certain impressions of the sense upon the assump-
tion of a major premise, itself the creature of a past experience. . . . I call to
witness here the common experience of every lawyer as to with how increasing
rapidity one's questions approach the realm of 'opinions' and 'conclusions' as he
approaches to the issue in dispute." L. Hand, Historical and Practical Considera-
tions Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40, 5o n.i (igoi).
7 Wio oRE, EVmDENcE § 1919 (3d ed. 2940) notes that no distinction between
"opinion" and "facts" is "scientifically possible," for "as soon as we come to analyze
and define these terms . . . , we find that the distinction vanishes, that a flux
1948]
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sum, his notion of the facts comes from his subjective, fallible
reaction to the subjective, fallible reactions of the witness to the
actual, objective facts." Considering the multiple subjectivity
of this process, it is misdescriptive to speak of the trial judge as
"finding" the facts.
In making his guess as to the credibility of the several witnesses,
the trial judge necessarily takes into account their demeanor -
their gestures, their facial expressions, their intonations. Because
these aspects of oral testimony vanish when the testimony is re-
corded on paper, in our legal system we wisely assign to the trial
judge, as his peculiar and exclusive function, the ascertainment
of the facts in cases where witnesses testify orally, and especially
where the testimony is in conflict - as it is in most lawsuits. Since
in such cases the determination of witnesses' credibility is thus
left to the trial judge, his F lies beyond criticism if it represents
a reasonable inference from a substantial part of the testimony,
although other testimony, were it taken as true, would compel
a contrary inference. To give a simple example: Mr. Angry
sues Mr. Brash for assault; in court, one witness states under
oath that, on a certain Thursday, he saw Brash hit Angry in
the eye; two other witnesses testify that they were with Brash
all that day and that no such encounter then occurred. If the trial
judge "finds" the facts in accordance with the first witness' nar-
rative, and if he correctly applies to that finding the proper sub-
stantive legal rule, no one is in a position to criticize his decision,
for no one can sLy that he erred in believing the one witness and
disbelieving the others. That disability affects all critics, including
upper-court judges when asked, on an appeal, to criticize the trial
judge's decision.
The trouble with the conventional theory is that it encourages
the erroneous assumption that the F, in the RXF=D formula, is
objective, whereas reflection shows that it is subjective, an SF.
ensues, and that nearly everything which we choose to call 'fact' either is or may be
only 'opinion' or inference . . . ." For "lay witnesses, all matters of measure,
identity, quality, and the like must be considered as no better than 'opinions'; and,
after all, the question whether Doe struck Roe first, or vice versa, may become
a mere matter of opinion. In short, the element of inference from observed data
is one which plays a greater or less part in every witness' testimony . . . ." See also
WIOMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 429 et seq., 467, 473, 478 (1913).
" A trial judge may also be affected by his unconscious predilections for or
against the parties to the suit and their lawyers.
[Vol. 61
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The formula, then, should be revised to read: RXSF=D. But
who, except the judge himself, can pass on the accuracy of his
SF, his subjective response to the testimony?
The difficulty of criticism often does not end there, since fre-
quently, no one other than the trial judge himself knows either
his R or his SF. In many jurisdictions - at least in some kinds of
cases -a trial judge is not required to report anything but his
laconic D ("Judgment for defendant," or "Judgment for plaintiff
for $5,ooo"). He need not state what his F was or the R he used.
If he does not so state - and many a trial judge in such jurisdic-
tions does not -his decision is beyond intelligent criticism by
anyone but himself. No one knows in such a case what part of the
testimony (if any) the judge really believed. Perhaps the part
of the testimony he really believed, if taken as true, would not,
under any acceptable legal rule, justify the judgment he entered.
Morever, since no one knows even the judge's SF, his R is also
undiscoverable. 2 In these circumstances the bases for criticism
are absent, for such criticism would call for knowledge of what
the judge thinks were the facts of the case. Nevertheless, such a
decision is deemed proper if a conjecture can be made which will
logically support it, i.e., if that decision would logically result
from the application of (I) some impeccable legal rule to (2)
facts which can be rationally inferred from some of the oral testi-
mony of some of the witnesses (even if that testimony is con-
troverted by that of other witnesses)." This conjecture is always
made if possible, i.e., it is always assumed, if possible, that the
trial judge's decision is correct.
II. INADEQUACY OF THE OPINION AS A BASIS FOR EVALUATION
OF FACT-FINDING
Possibility of Deliberate or Unconscious Falsification of Find-
ings. - To discover what the judge really thought were the facts,
it would be necessary to ascertain what "went on in his mind." It
is difficult to explore the mind of any man. In the case of a witness,
12 On appeal from a decision in such a case, the upper court must surmise both
the trial judge's R and his F. In such a case, the upper-court judges, even when
they agree about their conclusion, may differ among themselves as to the R and
the F. Cf. Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645, 664 (1932).
"3I assume that the trial judge made no important procedural errors during
the trial.
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cross-examination and other devices are available which may tend
to show, partially at least, what the witness is thinking while on the
witness stand or had previously thought. But it is not permissible
to cross-examine a trial judge or to use other methods applicable
to witnesses. 4 How, then, can one "investigate his secret thought
or intentions? He is the only master of them, and what he says
must be conclusive, as there is nothing which can contradict or
explain it." 15
Because, for a variety of reasons, unexplained, inscrutable,
decisions have been deemed undesirable, in some jurisdictions
published explanations have been made mandatory, as, for in-
stance, in the federal courts under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
which require the trial judges to file special findings of fact in
most civil cases. However, many federal district judges resent
this requirement. An explanation of that resentment was given
in a recent comment, by former Federal District Judge McLellan,
on a new federal rule which provides that, if a defendant so re-
quests, the trial judge must make special findings of fact in a
criminal case tried without jury. Of that rule, Judge McLellan
said: "We all know, don't we, that when we hear a criminal case
tried we get convinced of the guilt of the defendant or we don't;
and isn't it enough if we say guilty or not guilty, without going
through the form of making special findings of fact designed by
the judge - unconsciously, of course - to support the conclusions
at which he has arrived." 16 Judge McLellan thus expresses his
belief that a trial judge's published explanation of his decision
will not serve the purpose of disclosing the actual basis of the
decision so as to expose it to effective criticism. His position re-
calls the story of Lord Mansfield's advice to a new trial judge that
he should give his decisions omitting his reasons, since his de-
cisions would probably be right but his reasons almost surely
wrong.
Judge McLellan's contention may be amplified from a different-
point of view. Since the reported facts of a case do not consist of
the objective events as they actually happened in the past, one
might say that they consist of what the trial judge thinks hap-
14 Cf. United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 422 (1940); Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 593 (i9o6); Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276,
306-07 (1904).
15 Duke of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board, L. R. 5 H. L. 418, 434 (1872).
16 FEDERAL RULES OF CnfnNAL PROCEDURE 173 (Holtzoff ed. 1946).
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pened. But that statement would be superficial: when the judge
publishes his findings, we can never be sure that they report what
he thinks were the facts. Those findings report merely what he
says he thinks they were. And seldom, if ever, can we learn
whether what he says on the subject of what he thinks matches
what, in truth, he does think.
Roscoe Pound once wrote that often "courts ...take the
rules .. .as a general guide, determine what the equities of the
cause demand, and contrive to . . . render a judgment accord-
ingly, wrenching the law no more than is necessary." He added
that juries frequently avail themselves of their "power to find the
facts in such a way as to compel a different result from that which
the legal rule strictly applied would require. . . . The judgment
follows necessarily and mechanically from the facts upon the
record. But the facts found were found in order to reach the result
and are by no means necessarily the facts of the actual case." 11
Pound more than implies that, not seldom, judges, when acting
without benefit of juries, do likewise. Dickinson, although re-
luctantly, writes, "There can be no doubt that occasionally courts
employ this power of finding facts to evade the necessity of apply-
ing a legal rule to a case to which it would otherwise be appli-
cable . ,, 18
'" PouN, Ar INTRODUCTION TO THR PEILOSOPHY OF LAW 121, 133 (1922). This
comment with respect to juries may be too sophisticated. See FRANx, IF MEN
WERE ANG ELs 85-87 (1942).
"s Dickinson, Legal Rules, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 833, 855 (193i). I have else-
where written of an instance of this kind: "The writer will never forget one of his
experiences as a young lawyer. He participated in a lawsuit, lasting a week, tried
by an able judge without a jury, during the course of which, on every doubtful
question concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence, the judge, to the
writer's great indignation, ruled in favor of the other side. To the writer's sur-
prise, a few weeks after the trial was ended, the judge decided the case in his client's
favor, with strong findings of fact. A year later the writer met the judge who
referred to the case, saying: 'You see, on the first day of the trial, I made up my
mind that your client was a fine hard-working woman who oughtn't to lose all
her property to the plaintiff who had plenty of money. The plaintiff was urging
a rule of law which you thought was wrong. I thought it was legally right but
very unjust. So I decided to lick him on the facts. And by giving him every break
on law points during the trial, I made it impossible for him to reverse me on
appeal, because I knew the upper courts would never upset my findings of fact.
That judicial conduct was not commendable. But the judge's story did open the
writer's eyes to the way in which the power of a trial judge to find the facts can
make his decision final, even if, had he correctly found the facts, it would have
been reversible for error in the applied legal rule." FANiE, F MEN WRE AN.GELS
98-99 (1942).
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I recently noted '1 that since, when a trial judge's decision turns
on his view of the credibility of witnesses, "his 'finding' of 'facts,'
responsive to the testimony, is inherently subjective (i.e., what
he believes to be the facts is hidden from scrutiny by others), his
concealed disregard of evidence is always a possibility. An upper
court must accept that possibility, and must recognize, too, that
such hidden misconduct by a trial judge lies beyond its control."
I doubt whether many trial judges thus deliberately "fudge" or
"force the balance"; this practice, when employed, is, I think,
usually unconscious or only semiconscious. As, however, such
findings are possible and are surely sometimes made, we can never
be sure whether, when a trial judge publishes his findings, he is
accurately reporting his true SF. To require a trial judge to re-
port publicly what he "found" as the facts may, for this reason
if no other, add little to our information about the way in which
he reached his decision.
The Non-Analytical Character of the Decisional Process: The
Gestalt. - I have probably amplified judge McLellan's plaint to
include more than he intended. Let me now adhere more literally
to his thought. He voiced a sentiment often expressed by trial
judges, but usually in private conversations. However, Judge
Hutcheson, after years of service on the trial bench, publicly
said that a judge "really decides by feeling, by hunching, and
not by ratiocination," that the ratiocination appears only when he
writes an opinion, which is but an apologia to "justify his decision
to himself" and to "make it pass muster with his critics." This
published justification (in the form of a reasoned RXF=D) is
ex post facto. According to Judge Hutcheson, often it is not the
vital impulse inducing the decision."
Is Judge Hutcheson's description wholly mistaken? And is
Judge McLellan's use of it wholly without warrant? I believe not.
Pertinent here is Gestalt psychology, the main thesis of which is
roughly this: 2 all thinking is done in forms, patterns, configura-
'
9 LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 123-24 (C. C.
A. 2d 1946) (dissenting opinion).
20 Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial
Decisions, 14 CoRr. L. Q. 274 (1929).
21 See, e.g., Koffka, Gestalt in 6 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 642 (1931); REICEMNBAcH,
EXPERIENCE AND PREDIcTIOx 100, 220, 221 (1938).
Akin to the Gestalt thesis are the theses of the "functional anthropologists," of
those who study human behavior in terms of the "total situation," of the "institu-
[Vol. 61
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tions. A human response to a situation is "whole." It is not made
up of little bricks of sight, sound, taste, and touch. It is an organ-
ized entity which is greater than, and different from, the sum of
what, on analysis, appear to be its parts. The gestaltist's favorite
illustration is a melody: a melody does not result from the summa-
tion of its parts; thus to analyze a melody is to destroy it. It is
a basic, primary unit. The melody, a pattern, determines the
function of the notes, its parts; the notes, the parts, do not deter-
mine the melody. Just so, say the gestaltists, no analysis of a
pattern of thought, of a response to a situation, can account for
the pattern. Thus George, a natural scientist, recognizes the need
of "contrapuntal thinking," a type of mental activity like that of
the artist who can "pay infinite attention to detail without losing
sight of the whole." 22
I do not suggest that anyone adopt completely this notion of
the "whole." But it does illuminate, does tell us something of
importance about men's reactions to experience. In particular,
it sheds light on a trial judge's "hunching." The trial judge, we
may say, experiences a Gestalt; that is why he has difficulty in
reporting his experience analytically.3 That is why, too, when
he has heard oral testimony, his decision, even though supported
by an opinion, may defy intelligent criticism. One recalls Kipling's
lines: "There are nine-and-twenty ways of constructing tribal
lays, and every single one of them is right."
Inexpressibility of the Decisional Process. - Some seventeen
years ago, I wrote: "The decision of a judge after trying a case
is the product of a unique experience." 24 To justify that remark,
let me now approach the subject of judicial fact-finding from a
different angle. This approach involves a consideration of logic
as applied to decisions, a consideration of the assumption that,
when a trial judge files a written opinion or publishes his R and
his F, he reveals the logic, or illogic, of his decision for observa-
tion by critics. Let us examine that assumption.
tional" economists, and of those who advocate "the functional approach" to the
judicial process. See, e.g., B fficr, PATTERNS oF CuLTuRE (Penguin ed. 1946);
RICE, METHODS 3W SOCIA SCIENCE 55, 549, 553-54 (193x) ; Ogden, Structural Psy-
chology and the Psychology of Gestalt in id. at 109, 113-17.
22 GEORGE, THE SCIENTIST 3N ActioN 120 et seq. (1936).2 See my dissenting opinion in Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H.
& H. R. R., 161 F.2d 413, 449-50 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).24 FRANK, LAW AND TME MODEPN MnTD 149 (1930).
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Relatively recent studies of logic have emphasized its insep-
arable connection with language. Perhaps the most perfect prod-
ucts of logic are the physical sciences, aided by mathematics-
which is, itself, a highly developed language and which, in its
"pure" form, is today generally regarded as another name for
logic.25 Stressing language as the source of logic, certain thinkers,
sometimes called "logical positivists" or "scientific positivists,"
maintain that, in effect, "What can I know?" means, "What can
I intelligently ask?" They assert that the answer is this: I can
intelligently ask whatever questions language clearly expresses;
I can know (at least potentially, or in theory) what experiment -
verification - will reply to such queries. Whatever under no
circumstances could be thus stated and be thus verified or refuted,
is a "pseudo-proposition." It is not true or false. It is unthink-
able, "meaningless." Of course, say these "positivists," men do
utter unthinkables; but those utterances are not rational. They
express "mere" emotions, feelings, like tears, laughter, or pro-
fanity. Feelings, therefore, have only subordinate importance,
are but the irrational reactions of that pitiable creature, man.
Susanne Langer, in her stimulating book, Philosophy in a New
Key, criticizes the logical positivists. She points to an important
defect of language: Words "have a linear, discrete, successive
form; they are strung together like beads on a rosary; beyond
the very limited meanings of inflections . . .we cannot talk in
simultaneous bunches of names." This fact gives a peculiar char-
acter to logic, i.e., "discursive" reasoning. "Language has a form
which requires us to string out our ideas, even though the objects
rest-one within the other" as "pieces of clothing that are actually'
worn over one another have to be strung side by side on the
clothesline." Only thoughts which can be arranged in this peculiar
order can be spoken at all; any idea which does not lend itself to
this "projection" is ineffable. This "restriction on discourse sets
bounds to the complexity of speakable ideas. An idea that contains
too many minute yet closely related parts, too many relations
within relations, cannot be 'projected' into discursive form; it is too
subtle for speech. A language-bound theory of mind, therefore,
rules it out of the domain of understanding and the sphere of
knowledge." 26
25 Cf. RADn , LAW AS Locic AND EXPERIENCE I et seq. (1940).
26 LANCER, PnnMOSOPHY I A NEW KEY 65-66, 75 (Penguin ed. 1948).
[Vol. 61
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Professor Langer maintains that the logical positivists go astray
because they disregard this inherent weakness of language. On
that account, they mistakenly depict human rationality as a "tiny
grammar-bound island in the middle of feeling expressed by sheer
babble," and deny reality to feelings. "Everybody knows that
language is a very poor medium for expressing our emotional
nature. It merely names certain vaguely and crudely conceived
states, but fails miserably in any attempt to convey the ever-
moving patterns, the ambivalences and intricacies of inner ex-
perience, the interplay of feelings with thoughts and impressions,
memories and echoes of memories . . .all turned into emotional
stuff." Much that we call "intuitive knowledge" is "itself per-
fectly rational, but not to be conceived through language." 27
Professor Langer (to sketch her views rapidly and skimpily)
asserts that language, which inadequately communicates feelings,
is not our only medium of articulation, not our sole means of
symbolizing our responses to experience. Notable for their in-
vention of non-logical forms to symbolize feelings are the fine arts.
They use "wordless symbolism, which is non-discursive and un-
translatable, . . . and cannot directly convey generalities." Their
"symbolic elements . . . are understood only through the mean-
ing Of the whole, through their relations within the total struc-
ture." Such symbolizing is as rational as that of language. Our
feelings, which dwell "on the deeper level of insight," can be
2 7 d. at 8o-82. Cf. DEWEY, PHmosoPHv AND CVILIZATION 100-02 (1931);
CAssER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH (Langer trans. 1924); ORTEGA, CONcORD AND LIB-
ERTY 61-63 (Weyl trans. 1946).
The thesis of the logical positivists which Professor Langer criticizes is closely
related to another thesis which runs as follows: only that which is "public" has
"reality"; and the "public" (i.e., the "objective") consists exclusively of that which
can be communicated, without any possibility of misunderstanding, by and to
persons fully acquainted with the medium of communication. All that which is not
"public" is "private" (i.e., "subjective"). Since feelings are private (i.e., not thus
communicable) they lack "reality." For an articulation of this thesis (which had
been indicated by Plato), see, e.g., HOGBEN, TnE NATURE OF LivING MATTER 30,
221, 246-48, 260-6i, 270 (I93i). It has been criticized severely. See Wallas, The
Idol of the Laboratory in CALvERTON, THE MAKING OF SOCIETY 764, 767-74 (1937) ;
cf. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 233, 249-56 (193i), especially
n46; Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 646 n.2ob (C. C. A. 2d 1943).
The "public-private" dichotomy is akin to the differentiation between "primary"
and "secondary" qualities, with the latter regarded as "subjective" and therefore
"unreal." See criticism in FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 87-105 (1945).
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known through "wordless knowledge" expressed in "non-dis-
cursive forms" - as, for instance, in music."'
Return now to the trial judge who has heard conflicting oral
testimony on a pivotal issue, and you will perhaps the better un-
derstand his difficulty when he tries to articulate the bases of his
"hunch," to state logically in words -i.e., by "discursive" rea-
soning- why he decided as he did; his decisional process, like
the artistic process, involves feelings that words cannot ensnare.
A large component of a trial judge's reaction is "emotion." That
is why we hear often of the judge's "intuition." 2 Holmes, re-
ferring to the decision of an administrative agency, said it ex-
pressed "an intuition of experience which outruns analyses and
sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions
which may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth." "
That comment applies as well to the decisions of a trial judge. He
cannot, with entire adequacy, formulate in logical, lingual, form,
his reaction to the conflicting testimony at a trial. His response
to that testimony is, in part, "wordless knowledge." To be com-
pletely articulate, to communicate that response satisfactorily,
he would be obliged - as a once popular song put it - to "say
it with music." " For his emotion-toned experience is contra-
puntal 2
Since the trial judge is not, then, engaged in a wholly logical
enterprise, the effort to squeeze his "hunch," his wordless ration-
28 LANGER, op. cit. supra note 26, at X98, 214-15.
2 See, e.g., Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 639 (C. C. A. 2d
1942) ; Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 220-21 (C. C. A. 2d
1942).
'0 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 598 (x9o7).
Si Victor Hugo said: "Music expresses that which cannot be said, and on which
it is impossible to remain silent."
22 All other difficulties aside, the clothesline quality of language puts a writer
at a disadvantage as compared with a composer of a symphony, for the latter can
deal with several themes at once, whereas a writer can express only one idea at a
time. See FRaNic, IF MEN WERE ANGELS ix (1942). Since the language of the Hopi
Indians, as Whorf depicts it, does not have this "clothesline" character, it may be
that some of the difficulty to which Professor Langer refers does not inhere in
language as such. In other words, Professor Langer in her stress on this defect
of language may be overgeneralizing, relying too much on the nature of a limited
group of languages. Perhaps Hopi trial judges can better explain their decisions
than can ours. See Whorf, Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Lang-
guage in LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND PERSONAITY 75 (Spier, Hallowell, and Newman
ed. 1941); Whorf, Science and Linguistics in HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN AcTioN
302 (1940); cf. FRAN , FATE AND FREEDOM 313 (1945).
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ality, into a logical verbal form must distort it, deform' it. His
ineffable intuition cannot be wholly set down in an R and an F.
There are overtones inexpressible in words." He has come upon
non-logical truth. One may doubt whether, even if he resorted to
music or poetry, he could make himself thoroughly understood
by others, when one considers the many discrepant interpretations
of artistic compositions and performances. 4 When he tries really
to express his composite response by a finding of fact (an F)
and a legal rule (an R), he may well feel that the result is a
misrepresentation of his actual experience in the decisional proc-
ess. Accordingly, he may, not unreasonably, resent criticism of
his decision when that criticism rests on that misrepresentative
analysis.
III. THE PROBLEM OF CRITICISM RESTATED
Subjectivity in the Fact-Finding Process. - Frequently (al-
though without resort to the word "Gestalt") something like the
Gestalt aspect of an artist's efforts has been stressed by those who
declare the futility of criticism of artistic products. For instance,
recently the novelist, E. M. Forster, writing "especially of
music," " asserted the existence of "a gulf between artist . . .
and critic." When a critic approaches a work of art, "two uni-
" "It is not a good thing to consider arguments from the point of view of how
they can be stated rather than from the point of view of whether they are sound
or not. There is a danger even in logic in human affairs. The practical problems
of humanity are not solved . . . by neatly framed codes. I think there is a prone-
ness in the legal mind to prefer formulas to facts and to place too much reliance
on the power of words." McMu.LA, LAW AND OTHER THINGs 259 (1937).
4, "it is unquestionable that the actual experiences, which even good critics
undergo when reading, as we say, the same poem, differ very widely. In spite of
certain conventions, which endeavour to conceal these inevitable discrepancies for
social purposes, there can be no doubt that the experiences of readers in connec-
tion with particular poems are rarely similar. This is unavoidable. . . . But no one
in a position to judge, who has, for example, some experience of the teaching of
English, will maintain that Shakespeare's appeal, to take the chief instance, is
homogeneous. Different people read and go to see the same play for utterly different
reasons. Where two people applaud we tend to assume, in spite of our better knowl-
edge, that their experiences have been the same: the experience of the first would
often be nauseous to the second, if by accident they were exchanged, and the first
would be left helpless, lost and bewildered." RIcRARDs, PRINCiPLES or LITERARY
CRITICISM I15, 212 (4th ed. 1930).
" Forster, On Criticism in the Arts, Especially Music, Harper's Mag., July,
1947, PP. 9, 12 et seq.
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verses have not even collided, they have [merely] been juxta-
posed." For the critic to claim that he "actually entered into [the
artist's] state" is "presumptuous." If a "critic comes along and
tells [the artist] what is right and wrong" about "his product,
[the artist] has a feeling of irrelevance." For there is "a basic
difference between the critical and creative states of mind." Why?
Because the artist "lets down as it were a bucket into his sub-
conscious. . . . When the process is over, . . . looking back on
it, he will wonder how on earth he did it .... There is . . . [a]
connection between the subconscious and the conscious, which has
to be effected before the work of art can be born, and there is the
surprise of the creator at his own creation." " It follows that
"the critical state is grotesquely remote from the state responsible
for the work it affects to expound. It does not let buckets down
into the subconscious."
A trial judge's composite response to conflicting oral testimony
has something of this opaque quality."1 For he, too, has "let down
a bucket into his subconscious." Bok, one of our most gifted trial
judges, recently said: "Each case [was] a work of art, so far as
possible, and not an act of grace or a scientific demonstration ...
It is here, at the point of the greatest judging, that the law can
cease to be a matter of rule and compensation and reach the realm
of the intangibles: gentleness of heart, with clarity of mind and
the quiet salt of faith. . . . The Law suffers from being thought
as of an intellectual profession. It is intellectual, of course ...
But it is not scientific in the sense of a science whose rules are
impersonal and beyond the reach of human emotions or behavior.
Emotion and behavior are the raw materials from which the law
6 This is an old idea. As to the "hunch" element in all sorts of thinking,
including that of scientists and mathematicians, see, e.g., BELL, MEN or MATHE-
MATICS 547-52 (1937); CAIRNS, THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 57-60 (1941); LEUBA,
PsYcHoLoGY OF RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM 240 (1925); L-wis, THE ANATOMY OF
SCIENCE go et seq. (1926); PORTERFIELD, CREATIVE FACTORS IN SCIENTIIc RESEARCH
97 et seq. (1941); WAIrAS, THE ART OF THOUGHT 8o et seq. (1926); Skidmore v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 167 F.2d 54, 69 n.37a (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
"' There are, of course, differences between the fine-artist and the judge-artist.
The former is free to deal with his material as he pleases. No matter how much
he deliberately or inadvertently distorts it, no one can complain. Whether or not
his published expression deviates from what he meant to express is no one's business
but his own. Seldom can the critic discover any such deviation. It is in this last
respect that the trial judge's decision closely resembles the fine-artist's product. See
discussion of Spingarn, p. 939 ifra.
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is distilled in one way or another. . . . There is no plea to be
made except to keep the law personal." "
Probably, many of the experiences of every man are unique;
even when an experience appears to recur, often it is with some
slightly novel difference.39 "We do not fall in love twice in the
same way," says Sullivan. "Even boredom has its shades." 40 To
criticize effectively a trial judge's decision we should, then, in
many cases have to relive his unique experience. That we cannot
do. Empathy can carry us only a part of the way into the emo-
tional reactions of another person.41 As I suggested in 193o, the
ultimately important influences in the decisions of a trial judge
"are the most obscure, and are the least easily discoverable- by
anyone but the judge himself. They are tied up with the intimate
experiences which no biographer, however sedulous, is likely to
38 Box, I Too, NICODEMUS 319-30 (1946). I would add, parenthetically, that
it is unfortunate that Bok used the ambiguous word "law," since thereby he may
evoke needless objections to his remarks. As to the desirability of avoiding, when
possible, the ambiguous word "law," see FRANx, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 279-84
(1942).
As to the inescapable pressures for, and need of, "individualization" of cases,
see FRANx, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) passim, and especially 138 et seq.,
149 et seq., i7o et seq. See Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury Trial,
12 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 166, I7o (1929): "Law and Justice are from time to time
inevitably in conflict. That is because law is a general rule . . . while justice is
the fairness of this precise case under all its circumstances. And as a rule of law
only takes account of broadly typical conditions, and is aimed on average results,
law and justice . . . often do not coincide. Everybody knows this, and can
supply instances. But the trouble is that law cannot concede it. Law- the rule
- must be enforced-the exact terms of the rule, justice or no justice. . . . So
that the judge must apply the law as he finds it, alike for all. ... But, this being
so, the repeated instances of hardship and injustice that are bound to occur in the
judge's rulings will in the long run injure that . . . public confidence in justice,
and bring odium on the law. We want justice, and we think we are going to get
it through 'the law,' and when we do not, we blame 'the law.'"
" Bridgman, an eminent mathematical philosopher, writes: "Situations do not
exactly recur; experience is lived through only once, and the matrix in which any
situation is embedded and which constitutes an inseparable part of the situation
itself is always changing and never recurs." Quoted by SONDELL, ARE You TELLING
THEM? 25 (1947).
40 SuiLLv , BEETHOvEN 35 (1944). "To define [a poem] as the artist's ex-
perience . .. will not do . . . since nobody but the artist has that experience."
RicirARs, PRINciPLEs or LITERARY CRITICIS 226 (4th ed. 1930).
4 See KALLEN, ART AND FREEDOM 1, 16-17 (1942); Zilsel, Problems of Em-
piricism in 2 INT'L ENCYC. OF UNIFIED Sci. No. 8 at 53, 8o-8I (1941); Frank, A
Sketch of an Influence in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHIOSOPHIES 189,
237-39 (Sayre ed. 1947).
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ferret out, and the emotional significance of which no one but the
judge, or a psychologist in the closest contact with him, could
comprehend. What we may hope someday to get from our judges
are detailed autobiographies containing the sort of material that
is recounted in the autobiographical novel; or opinions annotated,
by the judge who writes them, with elaborate explorations of the
background factors in his personal experience which swayed him
in reaching his conclusions. For in the last push, a judge's deci-
sions are the outcome of his entire life-history." 42 And, of course,
this life history can never be duplicated by the critic.
It is reassuring to have my thesis confirmed by Judge Bok, who,
in a semi-autobiographical novel, says of the "average" trial
judge: "His friends, his family life, his vacations, his religion -
a little of these must be known in order to feel the integrity of
experience of which his work is the outward expression. But there
still remains the mystery of each man's personality, -and it defies
analysis." 13
To avoid misunderstanding, I must say emphatically that when
I speak of the obscure influences - reflecting the trial judge's
life history -which affect his decisions, I refer primarily to his
biases and predilections not with respect to the rules (the R's)
but with respect to the witnesses. I mean the trial judge's plus
or minus reactions to women, or red-headed women, or spinsters,
or to bearded men, or men with squints or nervous mannerisms,
or to Catholics, or Masons, or Republicans, or labor leaders, when
any such persons testify. Those prejudices are usually deeply
42 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 114-15 (1930). "What we call the
'facts' of a case constitute, often, the most important ingredient of the trial judge's
decision. But when the testimony is in conflict- as it is in thousands of cases -
the 'facts' of a law suit consist of the judge's belief as to what those facts are.
That belief results from the impact on the judge of the words, gestures, postures,
and grimaces of the witnesses. His reaction -inherently and inescapably sub-
jective - is a composite of the way in-which his personal predilections and preju-
dices are stimulated by the sights and sounds emanating from the witnesses.
Now those personal attitudes of the judge reflect the subtlest influences of his
experience and of the manner in which he has moulded them into what we de-
scribe, loosely, as his 'personality.' Where he was born and educated, his parents,
the persons he has met, his teachers and companions, the woman he married, the
books and articles he has read-these and multitudinous other factors, undis-
coverable for the most part by any outsider, affect his notion of the 'facts.'"
Frank, A Sketch of an Influence in INTERPRETAToNs OF MODERN LEGAL Pnroso-
Pirms x8g, 235 (Sayre ed. 1947).
43 Box, I Too, NicODEMus 3-4 (1946).
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buried, unknown to others, often unknown to the judge himself.
It is no answer that, in certain kinds of thinking, the predilec-
tions of a thinker lack significance to anyone interested in the
validity of his conclusion. Perhaps one may properly assert that
the "personal history of Gauss is entirely irrelevant to the ques-
tion of the adequacy of his proof that every equation has a root;
and the inadequacy of Galileo's theory of the tides is independent
of the personal motives which led Galileo to hold it." 11 But that
cannot be said of the trial judge's decision after a trial, when the
oral testimony was in conflict. For one premise of his reasoning
-the fact premise- may be at the mercy of his biases, biases
of a kind usually immune from scrutiny. 5 He is, so to speak, like
one of Leibniz's windowless monads: his experience is not fully
penetrable by any human being.
Underestimation by Legal Thinkers of Subjective Influences on
Decisions.- With the exception of Austin, most legal thinkers,
until recently, brushed aside such influences; " and those who
did not do so failed to observe the effects of such factors on trial-
court decisions. Austin, in discussing the "motives" which induce
the making of legal rules, whether by a legislature or a judge,
included such matters as the blandishments of an emperor's
wife. 7 Gray rejected consideration of such "motives," -calling
them "illegitimate." He wrote: "Of course, the motives of a
judge's opinion may be almost anything- a bribe, a woman's
blandishments, the desire to favor the administration or his politi-
cal party, or to gain popular favor or influence; but those are
not sources which jurisprudence can recognize as legitimate." 48
Holmes, earlier, had admitted the existence of "singular motives"
for a judge's decision, such as a doctrine of political economy, a
woman's "blandishments," political aspirations, or the gout. But
he said that such motives should not be considered because they
COHEN AND NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 380
(1934).
"' For an elaboration of this thesis, see Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL.
L. REV. 645, 658-62 (1932).
"' See Frank, Are Judges Humnan?, 8o U. oF PA. L. REv. 233, 26o-61 (x931).
472 AusTn¢, JURISPRUDENCE 554, 56o-64 (4th ed., Campbell, 1873). Austin,
however, had little interest in trial-court decisions. He was interested primarily
in the legal rules.
" See GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 191, 200, 213, 222-30,
236, 257, 266-69, 273-76 (2d ed., Gray, 1921).
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cannot "be relied upon as likely in the generality of cases to pre-
vail" and therefore do not "afford a ground for prediction" of
decisions.49 Goitein, defining "law" as the "sum of the influences
that determine decisions in courts of justice," seems to exclude all
but "legitimate" influences.5"
The school of "sociological jurisprudence" wisely noted the
effects of the social, economic, and political views of judges. But
because that school primarily studied the legal rules, and, there-
fore, the published opinions of upper courts, it disregarded, for
the most part, the less obvious components of judges' attitudes.51
Cardozo was less restricted. He wrote: "Deep below conscious-
ness are other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and
the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits
and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or
judge." 52 However, as Cardozo had little interest in trial-court
fact-finding, because he believed it did not affect "jurisprudence,"
he never discussed the impact of such influences on trial judges'
findings of fact.53 Yet the way those influences affect trial judges
has far more significance for most litigants than the way they
affect upper-court judges, because, for reasons previously can-
vassed, trial-court decisions usually have finality.
Professor Frankfurter (now Mr. Justice Frankfurter), writ-
ing of the interpretation by Supreme Court justices of the broad
terms of the Constitution, said "that each Justice is impelled to
depend upon his own controlling conceptions, which are in turn
bound by his experience and imagination, his hopes and fears, his
faith and doubts." After noting the need of "rare intellectual
disinterestedness and penetration, lest limitations in personal ex-
perience and imagination operate as limitations of the Constitu-
4"Holmes, Book Notice, 6 Am. L. REv. 723 (1872), reprinted in 44 HARv. L.
REV. 788, 790 (1931). Holmes did not elsewhere repeat these ideas. His later
writings indicate that he may have abandoned them. Cf. HoLmEs, TnE Co.soN
LAW 1, 5, 35-36 (i88i).
'o Goitein, Jurisprudence in 13 ENcYc. BRrr. x97 (14th ed. 1936).
" For elaboration of this criticism of "sociological jurisprudence," see FaATM,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 1O4-6 (1930); cf. id. at 268 n.j for criticism of
Dickinson in this respect; see also as to Dickinson, Frank, Are Judges Human?,
80 U. oF PA. L. REV. 233, 250-52 (i931).
5 CARDozo, TnE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-68 (1921).
53 For criticism of Cardozo on this score, see FRANK, Ir MEN WERE ANGELS
285-94 (1942).
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tion," he remarked, "The familiar and unconscious play an enor-
mous role in the exercise of the judicial process, particularly
where it closely touches contemporary economic and social prob-
lems." And, quoting Lord Justice Scrutton's comment that "It
is very difficult sometimes to be sure that you have put yourself
into a thoroughly impartial position between two disputants, one
of your own class and one not of your class," he added, "This
psychological factor is, of course, of infinitely greater significance
where a court possesses the powers of our Supreme Court." "
With deference, I disagree. As the "unconscious" factors opera-
tive when Supreme Court justices confront economic and social
problems lurk fairly close to the surface of consciousness, they
are not too difficult for third persons to discern, and should be
fairly easy for the justices themselves to bring to consciousness
and within the range of self-control. But the same cannot be said
of many of the "unconscious" factors operative in a trial judge
when he confronts divers sorts of witnesses.55
Explanation in the Preoccupation of Such Thinkers with Sub-
stantive Rules. - Spingarn regards as the sole futnction of the
critic of poetry a critical understanding of the poet's aim: the
critic should "re-dream the poet's dream," should ask, "What has
the poet tried to express and how has he expressed it?" 5' Assum-
ing it to be possible to answer that question with respect to poetry,
often it is not possible to answer a similar question with respect
to the trial judge who decides a case involving a credibility issue:
because of the inaccessibility of what the trial judge has tried to
express, his critic cannot "re-dream" the judge's "dream." Al-
though some persons contend that no objective aesthetic stan-
dards exist, that contention is too sweeping. There are minimal
" Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution in MR. JusTIc.
HOLMEs 46, 52, 60, 231 (Frankfurter ed. 1931).
" Here it is essential to differentiate the kind of "facts" I have been discuss-
ing (i.e., inferences from oral testimony) and another kind which may be la-
beled "background facts" or "social and economic facts" - the kind dealt with
in the so-called "Brandeis briefs." Frequently, the courts take judicial notice of
that second species of facts (although sometimes such facts may be introduced as
evidence in the trial court). With respect to background facts, many of which
are in the form of statistics, the element of subjectivity has far less import, al-
though it is a mistake to believe that even such facts are always completely objec-
tive. See discussion of statistical data in Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56
YALE L. J. 1303, 1334-35 (I947).
"6 Spingarn, The New Criticism in CRITICISM IN AMERICA 9, 14 (1924).
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uniformities in human nature,57 and, in any given culture at any
given time, minimal cultural uniformities; these uniformities
yield an irreducible minimum of artistic norms. For similar rea-
sons, there is an irreducible minimum of moral norms. " Those
moral norms (group ideals and values) express themselves, to
some extent, in the substantive legal rules. In that sense, we can
attain objectivity in criticism of the R's which the courts employ,
and therefore of upper-court opinions, which concern themselves
chiefly with the R's.
But similar objectivity is not possible in criticism of most trial-
court decisions. As we have seen, when a trial judge hears oral
testimony, his decision results from a reaction to the witnesses,
and that reaction is a composite which derives from all kinds of.
obscure, inarticulated, attitudes and prejudices. If articulated,
these attitudes and prejudices would spell out, as the judge's, per-
sonal moral norms which might be aberrant from the accepted
moral views of the community. Such hidden, personal, moral
norms are idiosyncratic. They vary from judge to judge. Deci-
sions which stem from such varying concealed moral attitudes are
little likely to express uniform social ideals. Since they lack uni-
formity, objective criticism of the resultant decisions is seldom
attainable.5 9
17 As to the relatively small quantity of such uniformities, see, e.g., FiRANx,
FATE AN FREEDOM 139, 199 (194g).
" Those who utilize the notion of the Time Spirit or that of the "climate of
opinion" are likely to overestimate the quantum and efficacy of such cultural
uniformities. See FRANK,, FATE AND FREEDOM 76-84 (1945); Frank, A Sketch of an
Influence in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL Pnmosopm=s 189, 217-18 (Sayre
ed. 1947).
" This conclusion, as I have elsewhere suggested, plays hob with "natural law"
in the judicial process. See Frank, A Sketch of an Influence in id. at i89, 235.
Speaking for our court, I recently indicated as follows how community atti-
tudes in part spell themselves into decisions but how they may fail to do so in
respect of trial judges' reactions to testimony: "Democracy must, indeed, fail un'-
less our courts try cases fairly, and there can be no fair trial before a judge lack-
ing in impartiality and disinterestedness. If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be
defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge,
then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. . . . every human so-
ciety has a multitude of established attitudes, unquestioned postulates. Cos-
mically, they may seem parochial prejudices, but many of them represent the
community's most cherished values and ideals. Such social pre-conceptions, the
'value judgments' which members of any given society take for granted and use
as the unspoken axioms of thinking, find their way into that society's legal sys-
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In studying objectivity and subjectivity, we still have much to
learn from Francis Bacon, a powerful, original thinker and him-
self a lawyer and judge. He described four types of obstacles to
man's search for truth: (i) There are the Idols of the Tribe,
errors "imposed upon the understanding" which are "common to
human nature," i.e., to mankind as such. They are "innate,"
"inherent in the very nature" of the human intellect. (2) The
Idols of the Cave are errors due to "the nature of each individual
man." They, too, are intrinsic. They "take their rise in the pe-
culiar constitution, mental or bodily, of each individual; and also
in education, habit and accident." Bacon includes the books a
man has read and the persons he admires. (3) The Idols of The
Market Place are extrinsic errors due to language, what today
we call semantic errors. (4) Also extrinsic are the Idols of The
Theater, errors caused by false theories and dogmas. As on the
stage, stories are invented, "more as one would wish them to be
than true stories."
To achieve complete objectivity, we would have to eliminate
all these four kinds of subjectivity. The first kind, the product
of mankind's finiteness, is inescapable; in this sense, as Bacon
suggests, men are uniformly "mad" (or, as Santayana says, vic-
tims of "normal madness" 60). The third and fourth kind (i.e.,
semantic and philosophic errors) are less stubborn.
The second kind, the Idols of the Cave, individual, peculiar
quirks, are the least obvious - even to the judge himself, al-
though each judge can do something, through cultivated self-
awareness, -to modify and restrain those quirks. It is this kind of
tern, become what has been termed 'the valuation system of the law.' The judge
in our society owes a duty to act in accordance with those basic predilections
inhering in our legal system (although, of course, he has the right, at times, to
urge that some of them be modified or abandoned). The standard of dispas-
sionateness obviously does not require the judge to rid himself of the unconscious
influence of such social attitudes. In addition to those acquired social value judg-
ments, every judge, however, unavoidably has many idiosyncratic 'leanings of
the mind,' uniquely personal prejudices, which may interfere with his fairness
at a trial. He may be stimulated by unconscious sympathies for, or antipathies
to, some of the witnesses, lawyers or parties in a case before him. . . . Much
harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and taking
the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all
predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine." In re J. P. Linahan, 138
F.2d 6go, 651-53 (C. C. A. 2d 1943).
6 0 SANTAYANA, DIALOGUES IN Lmno 36-57 (1925),
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subjectivity which I stress in this paper, and this kind of sub-
jectivity which has been ignored by the legal thinkers who min-
imize the difficulties of criticism.
Such thinkers overlook the distinction between the more or less
"objective" character of the norms embodied in the legal rules
and the "subjective" character of the trial judge's response to
oral testimony. They are thinking of upper-court opinions in
cases in which those courts accept as their F the explicit findings
of the trial courts. In any such upper-court decision, the F is
given, and the critic therefore need ask merely whether the appel-
late court in its opinion (i) used a proper R and (2) logically
applied it to the given F. Subjectivity and the gestalt factor often
have relatively little effect on such an opinion.
Indeed, neglect of trial courts and fixation of attention on the
substantive legal rules may induce forgetfulness of the problems
I have been discussing. For many substantive rules purport to
exclude the troublesome element of subjectivity. Typical is the
"objective" theory or doctrine of contract formation, now widely
in vogue, according to which the actual intention of the parties
to a contract becomes irrelevant, and the intention must be as-
certained solely from the objective expression of their intention.61
But that exclusion of subjectivity is often illusory. For the
"objective" theory does not shut out oral testimony. Such testi-
mony, for instance, has to be introduced to prove the objective
intention to enter into an oral contract. If the alleged contract is
written, oral testimony will be received which tends to show that
neither party had an intention to make a contract (i.e., that
the writing was meant to be a joke or sham) or that the writing
does not set forth the entire agreement; such testimony will also
be received in support of the defense of forgery, or fraud, or
duress, or performance, or release, or of divers other defenses.6"
Whenever a crucial issue in a case requires the trial court to ad-
mit oral testimony, there enter, necessarily, the subjective reac-
tions of the witnesses (in their observation of the past events, in
their memory of that observation, and in their narration of that
memory). There also enter, necessarily, the subjective responses
of the trial judge (or jury) to the witnesses. We ask the trial
61 See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. R., 153, F.2d 757, 761 et seq. (C. C. A. 2d
1946) (concurring opinion).
"2 See Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L. J. 603 (1944).
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judge to discover an objective intention- through his own sub-
jective processes. 3 In other words, a substantive rule, even if it
sets an objective test, should become operative only if the facts
to which that rule pertains have been "procedurally estab-
lished"; 64 and the procedural establishment of facts by oral testi-
mony opens the door to subjective factors."5 Only if one locks
oneself up in an unreal, substantive-rule, legal world will one be-
lieve that subjectivity can be avoided.
Hexner is typical of those critics who restrict their criticisms
to the legal rules applied by the courts. Calling subjectivity
"intra-subjectivity," and objectivity "inter-subjectivity," he
writes that "a legal rule is essentially an inter-subjective (social)
act contrasting with both the intra-subjective acts (not yet ex-
pressed in the external world) and pure monologues (not yet ex-
pressed to the external world), which are expressed but not know-
able to other persons." 66 But Hexner has not considered (i) how
thoroughly "intra-subjective" are a trial judge's reactions to oral
testimony, and (2) how, gestalt-like, the rules and the "facts"
interact in such a judge's thinking.
Subjectivity in Historical Criticism.- The trial judge as his-
torian has one distinct advantage over professional writers of his-
tory. Usually the judge sees and hears most of the witnesses
from whose testimony he tries to learn the fragment of the past
which concerns him, while usually the historian's witnesses are in
6 3 See Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 647 (C. C. A. 2d 1943): "We
can largely rid ourselves of concern with the subjective reactions of the par-
ties; when, however, we test their public behavior by inquiring how it appears
to the 'reasonable man,' we must recognize, unless we wish to fool ourselves,
that although one area of subjectivity has been conquered, another remains
unsubdued. For instance, under the parol evidence rule, the standard of inter-
pretation of a written contract is usually 'the meaning that would be attached
to' it 'by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages and
knowing all the circumstances prior to, and contemporaneous with, the making'
of the contract, 'other than oral statements by the parties of what they intended
it to mean.' We say that 'the objective viewpoint of a third person is used.' But
where do we find that 'objective' third person? We ask judges or juries to dis-
cover that 'objective viewpoint' - through their own subjective processes. Being
but human, their beliefs cannot be objectified, in the sense of being standardized."
6 4 See In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 463 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
65 It is of interest that the "reasonable man" test stems from "natural law"
concepts. See Beidler & Bookmyer v. Universal Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 828, 83o n.7
(C. C. A. 2d 1943).
"e HEXNER, STUDIES iN LEoAL TERmiNOLOGY 44-45 (1941).
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the grave. On the other hand, the judge has but a limited amount
of time for investigation and is restricted by rules of evidence,
while the historian can spend most of his life exploring the segment
of the past which interests him, and is hampered by no evidentiary
rules. Nevertheless, because of the marked resemblance between
the function of the trial judge and that of the history-writer, it
becomes pertinent here to consider what some historians have
said of the subjective element in the work of the historian.67
The historian's job, we are told, is to study "events not ac-
cessible to . . . observation, and to study those events inferen-
tially, arguing to them from something else which is accessible
. . . to observation . . ." i.e., the evidence. For he "is not an
eye-witness of the facts he desires to know . . ." His "only
possible knowledge is mediate or inferential or indirect, never
empirical." He must endeavor to "re-enact the past in his own
mind." 68 In this endeavor, he performs two tasks: (i) He first
critically examines the evidence, attempting to determine which
(if any) of his witnesses made reliable reports. To discover the
real meanings which lie behind a witness' words, the historian
must try to identify himself with the witness, to relive the witness'
life. The witness' "personality intervenes between" the historian
and "the facts." 69 This task leaves "a very large role to the tact,
finesse, and intuition" of the historian, involves an evaluation of
credibility which is largely "subjective." 1o For the historian does
not passively accept testimony but interprets it, and the criterion
in his critical interpretation "is the historian himself." " (2)
Having evaluated the credibility of the testimony, the historian
must construct a narrative of the past events. This narrative "is
at once a synthesis and a hypothesis. It is a synthesis inasmuch as
it combines the mass of known facts in an account of the whole;
it is a hypothesis inasmuch as the relations that it establishes be-
tween the facts are neither evidence nor verifiable by them-
selves. . . . Everything then depends . . . upon the degree of
the creative imagination of the historian and upon his general con-
67 For a more detailed discussion, see FRAwx, FATE AxD FREDom 11-14, 18-
41 (194S).
08 COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 251-52, 282 (Knox ed. 1946).
P9 pirenne, What are Historians Trying To Do? in RICE. METHODS IN SOCIAL
SCIENCE 435, 437-39 (193i)-
70 Id. at 439.
71 See COLLINGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 68, at 138.
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ception of human affairs." 72 The historian "imagines the past."
His picture of the past is a "web of imaginative construction
stretched between certain fixed points" provided by his critical
judgment of his witnesses' testimony.7 Here, obviously, sub-
jectivity enters.
"The human actions which [historians] study cannot appear
the same to different historians. It needs only a moment of re-
flection to understand that two historians using the same material
will not treat it in an identical fashion, primarily because the
creative imagination which permits them to single the factors of
movements out of chaos varies, but also because they do not have
the same ideas as to the relative importance of the motives which
determine men's conduct. They [divers historians] will inevitably
write accounts which will contrast as do their personalities ...
Thus, historical syntheses depend to a very large degree not only
upon the personality of their authors but upon all the social, reli-
gious, or natural, environments which surround them. It follows,
therefore, that each historian will establish ... relationships de-
termined by the convictions, the movements, and the prejudices,
that have molded his point of view." These elements shape his
peculiar "conjectural reconstitution of the past." 14 Must we not
say the same of the trial judge?
Of course, the historian, like the trial judge, may have before
him evidence the authenticity of which is indubitably clear. Thus
he may have no possible doubt of the words of a particular treaty
or that Lincoln issued his emancipation proclamation on a certain
day. But, when it comes to a determination of the causal relations
of any such facts to other facts, each historian must often draw
on his "constructive imagination." Wherefore historians often
disagree about such matters - just as two trial judges often dis-
75agree about the facts of a case. -
72 Pirenne, supra note 69, at 435, 441.
71 COLLINGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 68, at 242.
7" Pirenne, supra note 69, at 433-34. Collingwood, by ingenious semantics, tries
to show that the historian's subjectivity can translate itself into a kind of objec-
tivity. See COLULNGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 68, at 292 et seq. But see the com-
ments of his editor, Knox, in the Preface. Id. at xiv.
" Such differences occur even when upper-court judges pass directly on a printed
record of testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Shipp, 214 U. S. 386 (igog) ; Bushey
v. Hedger Corp., 167 F.2d 9 (C. C. A. 2d 1948); FRAic, I MEN WERE A 0ELS
78-80 (942). Consider here the subtle implications of the following: "By objec-
tivity I mean that quality of a rule of law which enables it to be applied to similar
1948]
HeinOnline  -- 61 Harv. L. Rev.  945 1947-1948
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Those who like to speak of "legal science" or the "science of
law" should read the comments of the more sophisticated histo-
rians on the difference between history-writing and the per-
formances of physical scientists. "No skilled physicist or chem-
ist," writes the historian Johnson, "would wittingly leave his ex-
periment in the hands of an untrained observer. He chooses his
assistants with the same care that he gives to his apparatus. But
the historian must take whom and what the gods vouchsafe. The
chief witness to certain historical events may be an ignorant yokel
or a thoroughly unreliable character whose partisanship is a matter
of notoriety. It not infrequently happens that an historical
scholar finds himself in precisely the predicament of a physicist
who should be called away from his experiment and have to trust
to the casual observations of an ignorant and unskilled caretaker
of the laboratory. But again the analogy fails, for the physicist
can usually repeat the interrupted test." 71 "Facts which we do
not see," say the historians Langlois and Seignobos, "described
in language which does not permit us to represent them in our
minds with exactness, form the data of history." 7 "The condi-
tions indispensable to all really scientific knowledge - calculation
and measurement -are," writes Pirenne,78 "completely lacking
in this field." History, he maintains, is at best but "a subjective
science." 79 It would seem wiser to call it a "subjective art." And
so, too, of the work of the trial judge: it is a subjective art.
situations with similar results regardless of the identity of the judges who apply it."
Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L. J. 571, 572
n.5 (1948).
76 See JOHNSoN, TE HISTORIAN AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 46-47 (1928).
77LANGLos AND SEIGNOBOS, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HISTORY 68 (Berry
trans. i898).
'8 Pirenne, supra note 69, at 443.
'7 See Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L. J. 1303, X332 (1947):
"True, as the better educated 2oth century man knows the physical sciences now
show up as far less exact than they seemed to all but a few thinkers during the
preceding three centuries. Nor can it be gainsaid that the practititioners of those
sciences successfully utilize 'ideal' concepts (e.g., 'frictionless engines') which involve
notions such as 'other things being equal.' It might therefore be suggested that the
difference between physics, on the one hand, and the 'social sciences' (including
'law') on the other, is merely one of degree. That is a tricky suggestion, because
of the width of the degree. It is said that the difference between a difference of
kind and a difference of degree is not itself a difference of kind but one of degree
- a 'violent' one, however. The difference here under discussion is peculiarly
'violent.'"
See also id. at 1333-34 as to the difference between (i) physical sciences and (2)
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One of Maine's sagacious utterances helps to bring this out.
He pointed to the absence of any rules to guide a trial judge "in
drawing inferences from the assertion of a witness to the existence
of the facts asserted by him. . . . It is in the passage from the
statements of the witnesses to the inference that those statements
are true, that judicial inquiries generally break down." It "is the
rarest and highest personal accomplishment of a judge to make
allowance for the ignorance or timidity of witnesses, and to see
through the confident and plausible liar. Nor can any general
rules be laid down for the acquisition of this power, which
has methods of operation peculiar to itself, and almost un-
definable." so
Interactions of Rules and "Facts." - Moreover, effective criti-
cism of a trial judge's decision is hindered by a circumstance which
does not hinder criticism of a historian's writings. The judge,
unlike the historian, is supposed to use substantive legal rules,
R's, in contriving his decision. Consequently, there may occur, in
his mental processes, interactions of the R's and the F, inter-
actions which may be exquisitely complicated in many obscure
ways. I shall here note but one of those ways.
As previously stated, it is a wise and accepted principle that a
trial judge's finding of the facts should be affected not merely by
the words of the witnesses but by their manner of testifying. Sup-
pose, then, that, when listening to the testimony, the judge thinks
a particular formulation of a particular rule will govern the case.
That rule will serve as his attention-guide, i.e., it will focus his
attention sharply on those witnesses who testify with respect to
matters specifically germane to his version of that rule. But
suppose that, when the trial is over, and the judge comes to his
decision, he concludes that his earlier formulation of that rule
was wrong. He cannot now vividly recall the demeanor of those
witnesses whose testimony is relevant to what he now considers
the correct formulation of the proper rule.8 As a result, he may
the "scientific spirit" which should imbue lawyers, judges, historians, and the so-
called "social scientists." As to "subjectivity" in the physical sciences, see FRAsK,
FATE AND FREEDOM IS0-84, 312-I5 (1945).
"0MAIN=, The Theory of Evidence in VILLAGE COMMUITIES 295, 317-I8
(i876).
" Consider here the situation when, after all the testimony is in, the plaintiff
amends his complaint to conform to the proof, thus introducing new R's or new
aspects of the R's.
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well find the facts erroneously. Yet neither he nor any critic is
able to know whether or not he did thus err.
The interaction of rules and "facts" may have some paradoxi-
cal results, baffling to both the trial judge and his critics: a trial
judge may want to decide in favor of one of the parties, say the
plaintiff. However, it may happen that, if the judge applies to the
facts - as he believes them to be - what he considers the cor-
rect, well-settled, legal rule, he cannot logically justify such a
decision. Sometimes, thus circumstanced, a trial judge, as we
saw, will "force the balance," i.e., he will deform his real view
of the facts and so state them in his findings that, applying what
he considers the correct rule, he thinks he can make his decision
seem justifiable. If he has heard and seen the witnesses, his
reported finding of the facts will usually be accepted on appeal
by the appellate court. But if that court concludes that he applied
an incorrect legal rule, it will itself apply what it considers the
correct rule to the facts so found by him, and, reversing his deci-
sion, it will decide the case for the defendant. Now it may well
be that, had the trial judge found the facts in accordance with
his true view of them, and, accordingly, decided for the defendant,
the upper court, disagreeing with the trial judge about the correct
rule, would have reversed him; it would thus render the decision
for the plaintiff which the trial judge had thought desirable but
which, due to his incorrect notion of the applicable legal rule, he
had felt unable to render on the basis of his honest view of the
facts.
Reformulation of the Theory of Decision. - The presence of
what, by way of shorthand, I have labeled the gestalt factor is
alone enough to expose the misleading oversimplification of the
conventional theory that a trial judge's decision results from the
"application" of a legal rule (or rules) to the "facts" of the case.
For note the word "application," and consider the following:
suppose that a trial judge has a strong unconscious animus against,
or liking for, Catholics or Italians, and that such a predilection
influences his attitude towards important witnesses who testify at
a trial - and thus influences his decision. Would it be helpful to
say that his decision resulted from the "application" of that
bias? 82 A more dispassionate description would be this: that
82 Such a statement might often be justified with respect to a jury's verdict.
See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 167 F.2d 54. (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
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bias was one among many stimuli which helped to bring about
the decision. Similarly, one should say that the legal rule is but
one of a multitude of such stimuli."
The traditional formulation being inadequate, especially with
reference to trial courts, one might, for the benefit of those who
like mathematical-looking formulas, suggest, as a substitute,
SXP=D, when S represents the stimuli, internal and external,
affecting the judge, and P the judge's "personality." The inade-
quacy of such a schematization, however, is too obvious to nec-
essitate discussion, 4 although that schema does serve to highlight,
among other things, the consequences of the judge's attention, or
lack of attention, while the witnesses testify."
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CONTROL OF SUBJECTIVITY IN FACT-FINDING
Requirement of Special Findings of Fact. - Despite the futility
of the attempt to use the written opinion as a basis for evaluation
of trial-court fact-finding, I think it highly desirable to require
trial judges - as well as administrative agencies 86 to make
" Cf. Keyser, A Study of Legal Science, 38 YAs.E L. J. 413 (1929).
" "Break down S, and you will find a horde of conflicting stimuli, some of
them being 'social forces,' some of them being the . . . 'rules and principles,' some
of them being undiscoverable. Break down P, and you will find a mass of 'sub-
jective,' unascertainable factors. And there will be no irreducibles behind either
the label S or the label P." Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. Rlv. 761,
775-76 (1932).
5 "What affects the attention given by the judge or jury to the testimony?
Kimball Young enumerates the following features of external stimuli which in-
fluence the attention of any observer: intensity, novelty, configuration, mode of
presentation, size, change or monotony, repetition, definiteness. The 'internal'
stimuli he catalogues as follows: physiological (hunger, thirst . . . fatigue, illness,
weariness); . . . aims (purpose, ideals); attitudes (likes, dislikes, loves, hatreds,
anxieties, avoidances). What Hans Gross says of the mistake of witnesses is worth
quoting here: 'The numberless errors in perceptions derived from the senses, the
faults of culture, mood of the moment, health, passionate excitement, environment,
all these things have so great an effect that we scarcely ever receive two quite
similar accounts of one thing; and between what people really experience and what
they confidently assert, we find only error heaped upon error."' FRANx, fIF MX
WEaE ArGELs 72-73 (1942).
I must add that my use in this paper of the words "stimuli" and "reactions"
indicates no belief whatever in "behaviorism" or in any other form of determinism.
See FRANx, FATE AND FREEDom (1945) passirn; Frank, Are Judges Human?, 8o U.
OF PA. L. REv. 233, 243-48 (1931).
6 I have heard some federal district judges express, almost in the same breath,
(i) objections to required trial-court fact-findings and (2) their contempt for the
alleged sloppy work of administrative agencies. But the cours can learn much
1948]
HeinOnline  -- 61 Harv. L. Rev.  949 1947-1948
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
special findings of fact. The usual argument for such a require-
ment - that it aids the appellate courts - seems to me to be far
less cogent than the argument that the breaking down of his de-
cisional process into two parts - the rule and the "facts" -
compels the trial judge carefully to examine his decision. "For,
as every judge knows, to set down in precise words the facts as
he finds them is the best way to avoid 'carelessness in the dis-
charge of that duty. Often a strong impression that, on the basis
of the evidence, the facts are thus-and-so gives way when it comes
to expressing that impression on paper." 87 A trial judge, every
now and then, thus discovers that his initially contemplated de-
cision will not jell, and is obliged-to decide otherwise.
It is no sufficient rejoinder that the judge's decision has its roots
in a non-logical hunch. Logic need not be the enemy of hunching.
Most of the conclusions men reach in their daily lives are similarly
hunch-products, originally arrived at in non-logical ways; yet
we do not deny that frequently the correctness of many of these
conclusions can profitably be tested by logical analysis. That a
conclusion is prior in time to the logical reasoning which justifies
it may make that reasoning seem artificial, .but does not nec-
essarily render that reasoning fallacious or useless. Even phy-
sicists and mathematicians frequently use logically-tested
hunches.8 8 "Of course, the mere fact that the reason given for
an act or a judgment is ex post facto does not invalidate that
reason. Jones may hit Smith . . . or make love to a girl, or ex-
plore the Arctic without reflecting on his conduct. When asked
to . . . justify his acts, he may give excellent reasons which are
entirely satisfactory." S' That is, despite the fact that he did not
act on the basis of logically-tested reasoning, his conduct may,
on analysis, show up as having been logically justifiable. When
any man tries to determine whether his appraisal of persons or
events is sound, he tests it by seeing whether it is a legitimate in-
ference from his data and from some generally accepted principle
or assumption."
from those agencies about fact-finding. See FRA ic, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 122-28
(1942).
" See United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (C. C. A. 2d 1942); Otis,
Improvements in Statements of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, i F. R.
D. 83, 87 (1940).
s See note 36 supra.
89 Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 654 In.2o (1932).
'0 "The process of judging, so the psychologists tell us, seldom begins with prem-
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So it may be with a trial judge's decision: he may first arrive
at it intuitively and, then only, work backward to a major "rule"
premise and a minor "fact" premise which show whether or not
that decision is logically defective." In so working, the judge is
doing nothing improper or unusual. The chronological priority
of his hunch does not mean that his subsequent logical analysis
is valueless. It may have an artificial appearance. But such an
appearance does not detract from the worth of such ex post facto
analyses in other fields. If one chooses, loosely, to call that hunch-
testing process "rationalization," then, in that sense, most logical
rationality involves some "rationalization." 92
Logic, said Balfour, "never aids the work of thought; it only
acts as its auditor and accountant general." That is too limited
a statement of the role of logic. 3 But even if logic's role were
solely that of "auditing," it would be immensely valuable. As
F. C. S. Schiller said,94 "to put an argument in syllogistic form
is to strip it bare for logical inspection. We can then see where its
weak point must lie, if it has any, and consider whether there is
reason to believe that it is actually . . .weak at these points.
We thereby learn where and for what the argument should be
tested further." " That a trial judge should make special findings
ises from which a conclusion ...is worked out. Judging begins rather the other
way around-with a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily
starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find premises which will
substantiate it. If he cannot, to his satisfaction, find proper arguments to link up
his conclusions with premises which he finds acceptable, he will, unless he is
arbitrary or mad, reject the conclusion and seek another." FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 100 (1930).
91 There is the story of the old lady, accused of being illogical, who, when she
was told what "logic" was supposed to be, exclaimed, "Logic! What nonsense! How
can I tell what I think until I know what I say?"
" See my dissenting opinion in Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H.
& H. R. R., 161 F.2d 413, 431, 45o n.82 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
Here we may gain instruction from what scientists have said about the use of
hunches. Typically, the great chemist, Kekul6, talking of the "inspirational" source
of some of his scientific discoveries, remarked: "Let us learn to dream, gentlemen.
Then perhaps we shall find the truth ...but let us beware of publishing our
dreams before they have been put to the proof by the waking understanding."
Quoted by LEUBA, PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM 242 (1925); see note 36
supra.
" See Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 CORN.
L. Q. 568 (X932).
o See FRAwx, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 131 n.3 (1930).
o To preclude misunderstanding, I hastily add that I am not here discussing
the use of logic in testing the legal rules. For a suggestive discussion of that im-
mense subject, see Hoernl6, Book Review, 31 HARv. L. REV. 807, 8o8-IO (ixi8).
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of fact is therefore of importance, since his doing so is essential
to his own logical assaying of his decision. 6 In sum, because of
the inescapable and un-get-at-able subjectivity of his reactions,
and because of the gestalt factor, his published report will leave
an unbridged gap between him and his critics; yet findings of
fact will act as a check on that subjectivity.
Nevertheless, to require the trial judge to make and publish
his findings of fact will yield no panacea where, because of a con-
flict in the oral testimony, the credibility of the several witnesses
becomes crucial. Frustration of the purpose of the requirement
occurs where, as too often happens, the judge uncritically adopts
the findings drafted by the lawyer for the winning side. For then
the judge may ostensibly find some facts of which, although they
are based on some testimony, the judge never thought, and which,
had he done his own job, he would not have included; in that
event, his finding does not represent any real inference he drew
from the evidence - does not reflect his own actual thought con-
cerning the witnesses' credibility." With conscientious trial
judges, however, that difficulty is not insurmountable. But a
graver difficulty remains: the facts, as "found," can never be
known to be the same as the actual past facts - as what (adapt-
ing Kant's phrase) may be termed the "facts in themselves."
How closely the judge's "findings" approximate those actual facts
he can never be sure - nor can anyone else.
Reduction of Inflexibility in Substantive Law. -The plea
(typified by that of Judge McLellan) for retention of what is in
effect the Gestalt in trial-court decisions may be translated as an
insistence on the need for the individualization of cases.98 Many
of our existing substantive legal rules call for the neglect of the
unique features of individual lawsuits, a neglect which often
deeply offends the "sense of justice." 11 Rules of that sort, which,
9 A related problem arises concerning special verdicts as contrasted with general
verdicts: A special verdict may exclude any Gestalt, since neither the judge" nor
jury is responsible for a composite decision. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R., I67 F.2d 54 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
" For judicial criticism of such findings, see The Severance, 152 F.2d g16, 99
(C. C. A. 4th 1945); City of New York v. McLain Lines, 147 F.2d 393 (C. C. A.
2d 1945); United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
9 See note 38 supra.
9 See, e.g., Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 J. Am. JuD.
Soc'y i66 (1929), quoted supra note 38.
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were they applied as they are theoretically supposed to be, would
yield results felt to be unjust, lead to oblique ways of circumvent-
ing the rules - general verdicts by juries, or decisions by trial
judges unaccompanied by findings of fact, or the twisting of such
findings so that they misreport the "facts." 100 In other words,
the discretion which such rules purport to exclude is shifted, in
a concealed manner, to some other component of the decigional
process. 10 Since the desire for individualization is obviously
irrepressible and since these oblique methods of achieving it are
disingenuous and otherwise undesirable,102 a wiser course would
be to revise many of such rigid rules so that they will permit open-
and-above-board discretion. Wigmore has shown that a workable
and orderly legal system has existed which candidly empowered
courts to recognize uniqueness in all cases. 03 We ought carefully
to study that system and to consider substantial modifications of
our own, instead of adhering to our present misleading and some-
what hypocritical practice of sanctioning furtive, unavowed, ex-
ercises of discretion.
Our system attains a greater measure of legal certainty in terms
of the rules, but a certainty which, in truth, is mostly an illusion.
We delude ourselves when we say 104 that, in cases which relate to
commercial transactions or dealings in "property," we avoid in-
dividualization and discretion through rigid and definite legal
rules. For, in any such case, either party can inject an issue
of fact involving an evaluation of witness' credibility -with all
its attendant uncertainties.0 5 The discrepancy between the pre-
tended certainty supplied by precise legal rules and the actual
unpredictability of many future decisions baffles the laymen who,
consequently, have no adequate understanding of an important
part of our government - a highly undesirable condition in a
democracy.
0 See, e.g., ibid.; Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv.
12, x8-ig (igo) ; FRANic, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 173-74 (1930); Skidmore
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 167 F.2d 54 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
lo' See, e.g., Frank, Words and Music, 47 COL. L. RE V. 1259, 1273 et seq. (1947).
102 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 167 F.2d 54 (C. C. A. 2d
1948); cf. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. R., 153 F.2d 757, 768-69 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
los Wigmore, The Legal System of Old Japan, 4 GREEN BAG 403, 404 (892).
104 See Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decisions, 36 HARv. L. REv. 940, 957 et
seq. (1923); PoUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 154 (1923) ; PoUND, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHITOSoPHy OF LAW 142 et seq. (1922).
"I5 See FRANx, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 99-Io (942).
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Improvement of Trial-Court Techniques. - Trial-court fact-
finding is one of the most vital aspects of courthouse government.
Yet it is the least studied, and, therefore, the most inefficient.
This state of affairs should demand the eager attention of all
lawyers who prize justice and detest injustice. For, because of
avoidable misfindings of fact, every year, men who shouldn't be
are hanged, or go to jail, or lose their savings or livelihood, and
have their families ruined.' 0 6
To acquire absolutely reliable knowledge of the objective past
facts of cases is beyond human power. Yet, although those facts
can only be approximated, we should strive to have that approxi-
mation asymptotic. Of course, we must rely on probabilities. But
there are degrees of probability. The facts as "found" are in-
herently guessy; but we need not be content with the present
guessing techniques of our trial courts. Everything feasible should
be done so that the probability of accuracy in discovering the true
facts of cases will be as high as is possible. That trial-court fact-
finding can never be completely objective, that unavoidably it
involves conjectures, that it is but one element in a Gestalt - all
this does not at all compel the conclusion that the traditional fact-
finding methods are not capable of marked improvement. 1° 7 To-
day, to a shocking and needless extent, they are tragically bad.
That condition cannot be ascribed to our trial judges. Among
them are some of the ablest and most conscientious public ser-
vants. But their tasks are far more baffling than those of upper-
court judges. The trial judges have received no special training
for their unique tasks; and they did not devise our antiquated
modes of trying lawsuits. With all the present hindrances to the
"procedural establishment" of the facts, the chances are large
that often the trial courts will fall far short of finding the true facts.
Little wonder that Judge Learned Hand once observed, "I must
say that, as a litigant, I should dread a law-suit beyond almost
anything short of sickness and death." 'o
Trial-court fact-finding is defective in part for reasons I have
not discussed above and which I shall but briefly mention here.
Some of the evidence bearing on the actual facts never comes to
light in the courtroom; the exclusionary rules may bar some of
"'
8 See In re Fried, i61 F.2d 453, 464 n.33 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
"7 See FRA x, Ir MEN WERE ANGELS 134-39 (1942).
108 L. HAND, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter in 3
LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 89, io5 (1926).
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the evidence. Other evidence may be unavailable: witnesses of
the past events are dead or cannot be found; important documents
have been destroyed or lost. One of the parties cannot afford to
hire investigators to discover, or expert witnesses to interpret, the
evidence. Juries are unskilled and often prejudiced fact-finders.
Improvement should, I think, include at least the following:
(i) We should give special education to lawyers who are to func-
tion as trial judges. Each future trial judge should be schooled,
among other things, in (a) a knowledge of his own biases and
prejudices with respect to prospective witnesses,'0 9 and (b)
the best available psychological techniques. (2) Without sur-
rendering the values of our present adversary procedure, the
government should assume a larger measure of responsibility in
ensuring that all practically available important evidence is pre-
sented to our trial courts; for liberal "discovery" rules will not
suffice to meet the problem of the litigant unable to pay for pre-
trial investigation or to hire experts. Without some such reform,
we shall not really begin to live up to the basic democratic ideal
of "equality before the law," since, as matters now stand, those
litigants who have inadequate funds often unfairly lose lawsuits
because they cannot afford to pay for justice in our courts."10
(3) Perhaps we should provide talking movies of trials; if care-
fully made, such recordings would perhaps render it possible at
times to evaluate the trial judge's views as to the credibility of
witnesses.11 (4) The special verdict should generally be em-
ployed, especially in civil cases." 2 (5) We might well have school-
training for prospective jurors." 3
The working out of the details of such reforms and the inven-
I'l Cf. Frank, Scientific Spirit and Economic Dogmatism in SciENCE FOR DE-
MOCRACY II, 20-21 (Nathanson ed. 1946).
110 See Frank, White Collar Justice, Sat. Eve. Post, July i7, 1943, P. 22; FRANK,
IF MEN WERE ANGELS 122-27 (1942); United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837,
849 n.40 (C. C. A. 2d 1942) (dissenting opinion) ; In re Fried, 16i F.2d 453, 464
(C. C. A. 2d 1947); WILLOUGMY, PRINCIPLES OF JuDICIAL ADmISTRATION 95-98,
206-07, 213-14, 457 (1929).
111 See my dissenting opinion in United States v. Rubenstein, I1 F.2d 915,
921 n.6 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
... See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 167 F.2d 54 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
Special juries might be helpful if selected, as they often were in fourteenth-century
England, from men having peculiar knowledge of the class of facts involved. See
L. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
x5 HARv. L. Rlv. 40, 41-42 (1901).
"' See Galston, Civil Jury Trials and Tribulations, 29 A. B. A. J. 195, 197
('943).
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tion of others call for the intensive efforts of our keenest minds.
But little help along those lines has come from the great majority
of law-school teachers, thanks to their lack of interest in trial
courts and fact-finding, and their obsessive interest in the sub-
stantive legal rules and upper courts." 4 Even the procedural re-
formers have confined their praiseworthy efforts almost entirely
to those phases of trial-court processes which manifest themselves
in judicial opinions in terms of procedural rules.
The importance of the legal rules cannot be denied. They ex-
press policies (i.e., ethical attitudes, social value judgments)." 5
In respect -of such policies, the law-school professors, by their
often brilliant studies of the substantive rules, have given the
courts assistance of incalculable worth. Yet all the efforts devoted
to the rule-embodied policies mean little in courthouses 116 except
in so far as they eventuate in specific decisions." 7 The best-con-
trived policies, expressed in those rules, are -wrecked on mis-
findings of facts in trials of specific cases. For a policy is not
actually applied, does not actually work, if applied to facts which
in truth never happened -as, for instance, when a man is con-
victed of a murder he did not commit." 8
I have elsewhere suggested that many of the legal thinkers who
avert their gaze from trial-court life, taking refuge in a legal
world made up exclusively of legal rules, do so out of a desire to
escape recognition of what are to them the emotionally disturbing
uncertainties of trials; and that those thinkers are dominated by
an attitude emotionally akin to that which gave rise to that belief
in magic that produced the ordeals." 9 Professor Max Rheinstein,
' See Frank, Book Review, 56 YALE L. J. 589, 594 (1947); FRmx, IF MEN
WERE ANoELS io6-o8 (1942); Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L. J.
1303 (1947).
115 See Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L. J. 1303, 1324 (1947).
x They may yield something in their effects on the habits of the community.
The anthropological study of the interaction of legal rules and social habits is
another immense subject which I cannot here discuss, but which I do not over-
look. See FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 103-04 (1942). I have dealt with the
subject more in detail in some unpublished lectures at the New School of Social
Research, 1946-47. Cf. Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L. .1303,
1324 (1947).
.. Herbage says that "music does not exist until it is performed." Herbage,
Brains Trust, I PENGUIN MUSIC MAG. 75 (1946).
' See In re Fried, i61 F.2d 453, 462-64 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
119 See FRaix, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 114-18 (1942).
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in a recent letter to me, offered a supplemental explanation. "To
me," he wrote, "the reason seems to be rooted in history. In
Rome, 'legal' activities were divided up among three groups of
men; the jurisconsults; the orators; and practical politicians,
statesmen, and, during the late empire, bureaucratic officials. The
jurisconsults busied themselves exclusively with the rules of law;
the practical administration of justice remained outside of their
field. Yet, their work has become the foundation of all legal sci-
ence ever since, not only in the countries of the so-called Civil Law
but also in the Common Law orbit. The style of Common Law
legal science was determined when Bracton started out to collect,
arrange, and expound the rules of the Common Law of his time
in the very style of the Roman classics and the corpus juris. All
the law books since his time down to Halsbury, Williston, or the
Restatement, have adhered to the pattern thus determined. Legal
education built upon these books has been equally limited; from
Pavia and Bologna to Harvard, law schools have regarded it as
their task to impart to their students a knowledge of the rules of
law and hardly anything else. Of course, for practical work in the
administration of justice such a training is far from being com-
plete."
Rheinstein, commenting on my notions of a revised law-school
curriculum, says that I am calling for the development of the
"science of administration of justice." Change the word "science"
to "art," and I agree. Instruction in such an art would include
firsthand observation of all that courts, administrative agencies,
and legislatures actually do. Such instruction would serve two
purposes. First, it would aim to equip future lawyers to cope
with courthouse realities, no matter how ugly and socially detri-
mental some of those realities are; for a lawyer cannot com-
petently represent his clients if he is ignorant of the devices which
his adversaries may utilize on behalf of their clients.'2 ° Second,
such instruction would stimulate the contrivance of specific prac-
tical means by which existing trial-court techniques can be im-
proved, in order that justice may be judicially administered more
in accord with democratic ideals.
Jerome Frank.
NEW YoRK, N. Y.
120 Cf. ARMSTOTLE, RHETORiC bk. I, C. I, X355b.
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